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26 March 1992

93-26083



26 March 1992 Final Student Research Report

Is the US Department of Defense the World's 911?

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Thesis: Recent world events have prompted some to claim that the United States' Department of Defense (DoD) had become the world's 911. An examination of this assertion indicates that the DoD only employs the armed forces to secure U. S. interests; therefore, the DoD is the Unites States' 911. This paper examines the national security strategy as it relates to military roles and missions.

USMC; Command and Control; C2; C3; C4I; Joint Command and Control; Operations; Missions; DoD; Strategy; Foreign Affairs; Military Affairs

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IS THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE WORLD'S 911?

Outline

Thesis: Recent world events have prompted some to claim that the United States' DOD has become the world's 911. An examination of this assertion indicates that the DOD only employs the armed forces to secure U.S. interests; therefore, the DOD is the United States' 911.

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IS THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEPENSE THE WORLD'S 911?

The employment of United States military forces will always be an issue of much concern. In the past decade alone our involvement in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait provoked varied opinions fervently expressed by both the American people and their elected representatives. Some have claimed that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become the world's 911 number. This term implies that the U.S. immediately responds to calls from any country who requests assistance in a crisis. The U.S. does employ its military forces to assist other nations, and in a variety of capacities, but it is not the world's 911. Whenever we intervene, United States interests are involved. An understanding of those interests helps military professionals prepare to defend them.

As stated in the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments, the Department of Defense maintains and employs the Armed Forces to:

support and defend the Constitution of the United
 States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

- ensure, by timely and effective military action,
 the security of the United States, its possessions,
 and areas vital to its interest; and
- uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States. (2: 2-5)

The constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in the execution of military action resides in the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates. The "national policy" of the nation in regard to national security is expressed in a document known as The National Security Strategy Of The United States. In the Preface to the August 1991 edition, President Bush states:

"We must not only protect our citizens and our interests, but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. We must work with others but we must also be a leader." (10)

This statement indicates a conscious decision on the part of the administration to take a prominent and active role in world affairs, but it also places conditions on U.S. involvement. "Our interests" and "our fundamental values" must be at stake.

As we have seen, the ultimate authority to commit military forces resides with the NCA. Brigadier General Krulak, Senior Military Assistant to the White House from 1986 to 1989, commented, "Make no mistake about it, it is the President who makes the final decision." (24) However, many sources influence the President in his decision—the advice of his political supporters and adversaries, professional military experts, and the voice of public opinion.

USES OF MILITARY

Military Intervention

The United States was thrust into the position of world leader immediately following World War II. Since that time the U.S. military has been committed to numerous actions, including forward presence, humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation operations, and full-scale combat operations. Precedents established by previous commitments of our military indicate that the U.S. has strategic concerns all over the world. Our armed forces have attempted to secure the national objectives of stopping the spread of communism and bringing stability to areas of strategic value to our country.

Korea

After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the Soviets occupied North Korea while the Americans occupied South Korea. The Soviets established a Communist government in North Korea and supervised a buildup of its army. In 1949, American forces withdrew from the Republic of South Korea believing it to be secure. (30: 202) On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army invaded the South resolving to reunify the country by force. When the U.N. Security Council asked member states to aid South Korea, President Truman committed U.S. forces. Shortly thereafter, forces from 15 nations arrived in support of the United Nations' proclamation. (25: 227) By early August three infantry divisions and a Marine brigade, 47,000 men, were defending the Pusan perimeter alongside United Nations and Republic of Korea forces. (44: 183)

Vietnam

When the French pulled out of Vietnam in the late 1950s, the United States encouraged the development of local governments in South Vietnam to build bases of support against Communist aggression. In December 1960 when the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam was

established in North Vietnam, it became clear that North Vietnam's military objective was to "liberate" the South. (30: 226) Following the Battle of Ap Dac in January 1963, the leaders of South Vietnam concluded that the country would need assistance to remain free. President Diem solicited additional U.S. military assistance. Only after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, did the President gain congressional approval to send large numbers of U.S. ground forces to Vietnam. By the end of 1967, 500,000 Americans were at war with North Vietnam. (25: 450)

Grenada

On 23 October 1983, following a meeting of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a joint message
from Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Montserrat, and Dominica requested U.S. assistance in
restoring order to the island of Grenada. This appeal was
further reinforced when the Prime Minister of Barbados stated
that he had received correspondence from the Governer-General
of Grenada asking for assistance. (1: 228) President Reagan,
convinced that the island was being developed by the Cubans
for Soviet use and concerned for the welfare of the American
students, ordered a task force to respond. On 25 October
1983, the U.S. armed forces invaded Grenada to rescue

American medical students and restore order to this tiny Caribbean Island. (23: 90)

Panama

On 20 December 1989, the U.S. deployed American forces to Panama not to contain communism but to protect U.S. interests in the region. Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega had overthrown a democratic election and was threatening American servicemen and their families stationed in Panama. The U.S. made several attempts to negotiate an end to the crisis in pursuit of our own stated national interests—"to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty." (11: 194) Within 48 hours of the invasion, most of the DOD's military objectives had been secured.

Military Support

The term "military support" refers to a U.S. commitment of personnel or equipment to foreign nations to bolster indigenous capabilities. The following examples of military support reaffirm United States commitment to foster the creation of democracies abroad, establish and maintain

alliances and security relationships, and combat illicit drug trafficking. These are all goals and objectives listed in the National Security Strategy of the United States.

Israel

During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel asked for military equipment and support when a number of planes and tanks were lost in the fight for the Golan Heights. The Israelis were also quickly running out of ammunition. A few days later, President Nixon ordered a large-scale airlift to resupply the Israelis. Tanks and planes were deployed to Israel to replace their combat losses. The U.S. Air Force responded on a grand scale, mounting 20 flights per day carrying an estimated 2000 tons of material. (9: 287)

El Salvador

In 1980 a civil war erupted between the government forces of El Salvador and the guerilla forces of Faraibundo Marti National Front. Soon after, the United States sent 55 military advisors to train Salvadoran forces in Central America. This limit coincides with a ceiling mandated by Congress on the number of advisors deployable to El Salvador. (23: 90)

Burna

According to the U.S. State Department, the world's largest producer of opium is Burma; an estimated 1000 metric tons of the illegal drug were produced in 1987. In 1988, the Burmese government requested U.S. assistance in the fight against narcotics. In response to this appeal, the DOD provided helicopters and planes to aid in the intercept of aircraft attempting to transport illegal narcotics out of Burma. (25: 140) Today, the U.S. Army is providing counternarcotics assistance to numerous countries in Latin America, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Belize, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Mexico. The Army also provides training to the military forces of these countries in specialties like communications, special operations, and aviation maintenance. (17: 10)

Humanitarian Relief

Title 10 of the U.S. code authorize the DOD to provide humanitarian assistance to foreign nations if these actions will promote:

- (A) the security interests of both the United
 States and the country in which the activities are to
 be carried out; and
- (B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

Other prerequisite conditions for humanitarian assistance, including a cost ceiling, are delineated in Title 10. (40) The DOD has conducted humanitarian assistance operations on numerous occasions.

Chile

On 21 May 1960, two earthquakes in Chile occurred within 24 hours, one measuring 8.3 on the Richter scale. Tidal waves swallowed the populated islands and battered coastal areas 500 miles south of Santiago. (37: 38) Within hours of the second quake, the Chilean government requested disaster relief assistance from the United States. By 30 May 1960, 59 Air Force Globemasters had transported several Army units to Chile. When the humanitarian effort ended in late June 1960, the Air Force had transported over 1000 tons of cargo in support of the relief effort. (20: 152)

Peru

On 31 May 1970, an earthquake rocked Peru leaving 70,000 dead and 800,000 homeless. Peru's President Juan Velasco Alvarado appealed to the world for relief assistance. Two days later, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command dispatched a disaster assistance survey team, Army helicopters, and essential relief supplies on Air Force C-130s. When American units returned stateside, Air Force C-130s and C-123s had transported 689 tons of cargo and evacuated 501 injured people on 234 sorties. (37: 38)

Columbia

In 1985, a dormant volcano erupted in Columbia killing 23,000 people. The U.S. Southern Command dispatched Army and Air Force units in the region. The 210th Combat Aviation Battalion in Panama provided aviation support for the operation. Within 36 hours of the eruption, 8 Blackhawk and 4 Chinook helicopters were enroute to assist Columbian residents trapped by the volcano. Air Force C-130s transported medical supplies, tents, and other relief necessities to the area. After 12 days of flying, Army aviators had hauled more than 300 tons of cargo and ferried 2700 passengers. (33: 37-41)

Civic Action

Civic action is much like humanitarian assistance, but it is on a more permanent basis. While humanitarian assistance is oriented towards "rescue" operations, civic action programs emphasize "nation building."

Korea

An early and important example of U.S. military involvement with foreign health care initiatives was in the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the late 1940s, numerous Korean medical personnel trained with U.S. Army medical units there. In 1949, a Korean Army Medical School was opened with the assistance of American military advisors. In 1950, many ROK medical personnel were trained in Army medical schools stateside. This program was considered a huge success; for years, ROK medical students trained in the United States were considered the leaders in Korean military medicine. (38: 12-13)

During the early 1960s, the United States became the principal provider of civic action programs in Latin America.

During this decade, 15 nations benefited from 3500 new

schools, clinics, and hospitals. U.S. military personnel also treated 3.5 million medical and dental patients in the southern hemisphere. (38: 14)

Vietnam

In 1970, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army awarded the 5th Special Forces Group a Civic Action Medal for its work in communities throughout Vietnam. The 5th Special Forces Group established 49,902 economic aid projects, 34,334 educational projects, 35,468 welfare projects, and 10,959 medical projects. The unit also dug 6,436 wells, repaired 1,949 kilometers of road, and built 129 churches, 110 hospitals, 1003 classrooms and 670 bridges. (1: 51-52)

Central America

Since the early 1980s, DOD medical personnel have been actively involved in every Central American country except Nicaragua and Belize. In 1983, for example, the Army's Combat Support Hospital, during a 6-month deployment to Honduras, treated over 40,000 medical and dental patients, and, in addition, provided veterinary care for 13,000

animals. Personnel from this unit also assisted Honduran medical personnel with an immunization campaign in the most isolated areas of the country. (38: 39)

The U.S. conducts these relief operations and provides foreign aid for a variety of reasons. From a humanitarian standpoint, the American people put a premium on reducing poverty and suffering in developing nations. From a political standpoint, when we provide this type of aid, we build alliances that benefit our nation and support our own concerns, such as gaining access to strategic minerals vital to our national defense. Economically, the U.S. benefits because many of these nations develop into strong trading partners, purchasing large amounts of U.S. goods.

CONDITIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Quite obviously, the United States has used its military capacity more frequently than the average citizen realizes. Our political and military leaders consider many factors before our armed forces are sent into action. Ultimately the decision to commit forces is made by the President, tempered by Congress. In his book <u>Fighting For Peace</u>, former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger recounts a speech to the National Press Club on 28 November 1984, entitled "The Uses of The Military." In this speech, Mr. Weinberger states

the six major tests he developed to determine whether or not the use of military force is warranted. Those six tests, in brief, are:

- 1. Our vital interests must be at stake.
- 2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the United States and our allies that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.
- 3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secure.
- 4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives.
- 5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people.
- 6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort. (43: 402)

The question of vital interests (test 1) provokes the real controversy surrounding the issue of military force.

What is or is not in our vital interests is not always apparent. Colonel Beavers, a member of the Strategic Studies Group X (see expl. *1), suggests our reasons for deploying military forces into action have undergone an evolutionary process. Initially, our justification was simply to provide for the "security of the United States and citizens abroad."

Trade, economic, and security factors expanded this phrase to "U.S. security, citizens abroad, and our allies." Finally, he prophesies that in the future, our armed forces will be used to protect not only the previously listed interests, but also "our way of life." Colonel Beavers states that "it is at this point that we will become the world's 911." He further clarified his interpretation of the "911 concept" by

explaining that in the next twenty years, the economies of different nations will become even more intertwined, and many American jobs will depend on foreign economies. (5) The United States therefore will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that our quality of life is maintained at acceptable American standards.

Caspar Weinberger recognized the economic interdependence of America, and used it as part of his justification for ordering U.S. ships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers being threatened by Iran in the mid 1980's. Mr. Weinberger Stated that even though the oil on those tankers was not ours, loss of any oil intended for Europe or Japan would in fact affect us because we would then be competing for a share of a smaller worldwide "pool." In addition, he pointed out that a very large percentage of oil in the Gulf is lifted, shipped and refined by American oil companies. He goes on to say that closure of the Strait of Hormuz would directly affect American companies that paid U.S.corporate taxes and employed U.S. citizens. "There is one market for oil: a global market." (43: 391) Later in his book, he emphasizes this interdependence of nations:

Clearly, no nation is strong enough alone to keep its own freedom. Every nation requires alliances, friendships or association of one kind or another with other countries who share its goals and ideals. That truth certainly applies to the United States. (43: 429-430)

U.S. protection of the Mideast oil supply is not considered a "vital interest" by everyone. The Defense Monitor, a pamphlet published monthly by the Center for Defense Information (see expl. *2) titled its January 1991 issue "The U.S. as the World's Policeman? Ten Reasons to a Find a Different Role." This article acknowledges the fact that "there is no national consensus about what constitutes the vital interest of the U.S." It also points out that "there is also no consensus about how to protect [our vital interests]."

In opposition to Mr. Weinberger's argument, the authors of this pamphlet state that:

Persian Gulf oil is much less important to the U.S. than it is to Europe and Japan. Japan imports 99 percent of the oil it consumes, 70 percent coming from the Gulf countries. The U.S., on the other hand, imports 46 percent of the oil it uses. Only 24 percent of U.S. oil imports and 8.5 percent of total U.S. energy supplies come from the Persian Gulf. Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil together account for just 7.5 percent of all U.S. oil imports. (13: 2)

The authors also contend that "any hardships suffered by the U.S. from losing access to Persian Gulf oil or from an increase in the price of oil seems negligible when compared to the devastating costs of war." The article stresses the

economic benefits of bringing our troops home from foreign bases, and attempts to demonstrate that this removal would not degrade national security. (10)

THE THREAT

Major world events in the past few years, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union, have placed the United States in a position strikingly similar to its position immediately following World War II. As the only remaining superpower, we can expect to continue to play a large and influential part in world affairs. Undoubtedly we will be appealed to by nations in crisis situations. The National Security Strategy (AUG 91) states "We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security problems. But we remain the country to whom others turn when in distress." (10: 2) General Powell has stated:

We've heard it time and time again, America cannot be the world's policeman. Yet, as I've learned time and time again in the ... months that I've been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when there's trouble, when somebody needs a cop, guess who gets called to restore the peace? We do. (15:82)

Clearly then, the military must be prepared to secure the objectives identified by the Commander-in-Chief. Weinberger believes that the Grenada operation proved that the military was functioning as it was meant to--"that is, as an instrument to carry out and help realize the objectives of the President's foreign policy." (43: 131) In a rapidly changing and turbulent society, today's military must be ready to perform many different functions. As Brigadier General Krulak stated, "America will go to war again, but it is difficult to pinpoint where." (24)

As the Strategic Studies Group indicated in their report

The Future Strategic Environment, "There is no visible

evidence of any single nation or situation which has the

potential to pose the same menacing threat to the West that

the USSR did during the Cold War." (14: 35) The February

meeting between President Bush and Russian President Boris

Yeltsin at Camp David resulted in a declaration, signed by

both, outlining an almost unbelievably new kind of

relationship between the two nations. "The relationship will

be characterized by friendship and partnership founded on

mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy

and economic freedom." (18: A26)

Determining the threat in the post Cold-war period is no easy task. As General Powell states in the <u>National Military Strategy</u>, "The real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain." He points to an aggressive North Korea, a weakened Iraq, and perhaps even a hostile Iran as specific threats, but is wary of the "war that no one

predicted or expected." (31: 4) Many experts agree that regional problems in the world pose a potential threat to the U.S. and our allies, and will become more prominent in the future with the loss of a superpower to keep "hot spots" in check. Colonel Beavers anticipates that future regional conflicts will be due in part to a tremendous growth in population in countries that don't have the infrastructure to support it. As an example he predicts that the Middle East's population will double in the next twenty years. The widening gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" and ethnic diversity will also cause much unrest. Other "hot spots" include Africa; the Indo-Pakistan region; and Central and South America, where illegal drug trafficking is prevalent.

Among the goals and objectives listed in the National Security Strategy, the U.S. seeks to "aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking." (10: 4) This reflects the U.S. position that "democratic institutions" are a vital national interest and we could conceivably use military force in the future to support them. It also indicates that the war against drugs will continue to intensify. Americans are growing increasingly more aware of the danger that illegal drugs cause in our society; indeed, they threaten our way of life.

As public pressure increases, it is likely that the military will become even more involved in the counternarcotic effort.

Drug Interdiction and the Military

The tremendous increase in the illegal drug trade has been an issue in recent political campaigns. While most politicians view the use of DOD assets as a viable option, few can articulate its implementation. In 1987, an experiment in drug interdiction using DOD forces was conducted to evaluate what the politicians had long discussed.

In 1987, the National Guard of Arizona received plans for Operation Autumn Harvest. The concept of operations called for units from Arizona, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Utah to conduct a cooperative drug interdiction along the Arizona-Mexico border. (42: 4) The primary objective of the operation was to detect and apprehend smugglers bringing drugs into the United States (42: 6). The plan called for an integrated air defense system that would include ground based radar systems and customs intercept aircraft which would cover 84% of the Arizona-Mexico border. The four ground based stations, in conjunction with the aircraft, were to intercept and track suspected smugglers 24 hours a day for 30 days.

While the operation did not meet its intended objectives, it did provide the unit with outstanding training and provided for closer ties between the National Guard Bureau and the Customs Agency. Despite tracking 93 planes that fit the drug smuggling profile provided by Customs, only six of 33 planes tracked were intercepted. None had drugs on board. (42: 11)

In the case of Operation Autumn Harvest, the National Guard operated within the confines of U.S. borders. However, can the U.S. legally commit its troops to foreign shores in order to stop the influx of illegal drugs? Sections 371-374 of Title 10 United States Code provide loosely for involvement. (40) These sections of Title 10 will undoubtedly be amended in the future as the role of the military increases in fighting the drug war. The ramifications are clear; governments around the world feeling economic and political pressure from the United States may invite U.S. participation in their anti-drug efforts. The U.S. military will be playing a larger role in the war against drugs, but exactly what role our services will perform remains to be seen.

FUTURE OF THE MILITARY

As the nation faces the reality of a "new world order," the composition, structure and role of the U.S. military are undergoing intensive scrutiny, and in fact, are the subject of much debate. Decisions made now and in the near future will have a lasting impact on the United States' national security. To meet the security requirements of the changing global environment, and the reality of a significantly reduced defense budget, the armed forces of the United States are undergoing a major restructuring.

General Powell currently envisions: a Base Force of about 1,600,000 uniformed personnel, containing twelve Army divisions (down six from present levels), a 450-ship Navy (down eighty-nine warships), three Marine divisions and air wings (same number, but with deep manpower cuts), approximately twenty-six Air Force active duty and reserve forces tactical fighter wings (down about ten), and modernized strategic nuclear forces reduced in number as a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty may specify. (15: 82)

This projected Base Force is divided into four packages: Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces. The Strategic Forces mission will be to deter the threat of nuclear aggression, and these forces will continue to possess a triad of the most modern weapon systems. That is to say that we will have modern nuclear weapons capable of being launched from land, sea, and air

platforms. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), initially proposed by the Reagan administration, falls into this category. The SDI Organization, under direction of President Bush, has refocused its efforts on developing a system of global protection against limited strikes (G-pals) rather than protection against a massive Soviet strike. (3: 105) This shift is consistent with the uncertain threat and the increasing proliferation of nuclear technology.

Providing a forward presence for the Atlantic Forces will be one Army Corps, three to four Air Force wings, two carrier battle groups and Marine Forces. To reinforce these units in a crisis situation are U.S.-based forces in the form of one Army corps, two Air Force fighter, one Marine Expeditionary Force, and four carrier battle groups.

Forward presence for the Pacific Forces will be "principally maritime, with half our projected carrier and amphibious force oriented toward this area including one forward deployed carrier battle group along with a Marine Expeditionary Force." (31: 22) Units that remain in Japan and Korea and forces in Alaska and Hawaii will act as both a forward presence and a crisis response force.

Contingency Forces will be maintained at "the highest possible readiness" levels and will come from both deployed

and U.S. based Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces. The Commander in Chief of the various commands will have a "broad spectrum of capabilities" to choose from.

As General Powell points out, the Base Force is the force of the future, and not the current active duty force. He anticipates that the Base Force will be in place in 1995.

(31: 19-24)

The Base Force concept is under attack from some members of Congress. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Les Aspin, claims that the base force structure is "out of date." He feels that the plan reflects only the "first revolution" of the Soviet's "new era," that is, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. The plan does not reflect the "second revolution," the collapse of the Soviet Union that began with the failed coup attempt in August of 1991. (26: A10) Rep. Aspin also criticized General Powell for focusing on the capabilities of potential enemies when developing his plan. Instead, Rep. Aspin emphasizes the need to identify specific threats to U.S. interests and build our military forces on this basis. (34: 4)

Senators Nunn and Warner have also attacked the base force suggested by General Powell, calling for further analysis of the Service structures in light of the new threat environment. (26: A10) Both Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Powell are prepared for the debate ahead;

as Powell said, "we'll be fighting a legislative war this year instead of one with people getting killed and injured."

(34: 3)

Role of the Marine Corps

In the current and future global environment, the Navy/Marine Corps team will continue to provide a wide variety of capabilities. Recently, the Marine Corps has participated in combat operations in Panama and the Middle East, humanitarian relief operations in the Philippines, non-combatant evacuation operations in Liberia and Somalia, and counternarcotic operations in Latin America. This versatility makes the Marine Corps the ideal force to deal with the "uncertain" threat of the future. As former commandant General Al Gray stated, "it is clear that our nation's Marine Corps is already organized for the security environment of the 21st century." (22: 67)

However, the Marine Corps will be undergoing restructuring along with the other services. From an end strength of 194,000 in 1991, the Marine Corps will come down to a strength of 177,000 by 1995. The mobility, versatility, and readiness that has always characterized the Corps will remain. Indeed, Brigadier General Krulak, who headed the force structure planning group for our current Commandant

General Mundy, stated that the Corps will be "more mobile and lethal than ever before." (24) The Corps' unique ability to integrate sea, air, and land battle will make it a prominent force providing both forward presence and force projection.

"This is our golden age" claims General Krulak. Defense analyst David Silverstein concurs; he states that "Marines have been oriented toward just the sort of conflict most likely to occur in the 1990's and beyond." (27: 16)

PREDICTIONS

While the 911 question in this paper's title is clearly rhetorical, it nonetheless deserves a definitive "NO" for an answer. The United States has never been the world's 911. If anything, it might be argued that we have arrogated to ourselves the right to involve our forces in the affairs of other nations. This, of course, is not the case either. The reality of U.S. military commitment worldwide as former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sees it, has been one of selective global commitment. (8: 7) With impending budget cuts and the end of the cold war, our approach to this commitment will become increasingly selective.

The United States now finds itself in a precarious power position. Morally, it feels compelled to aid in the

development of pluralistic governments in those nations previously dominated by the Soviet Union. Economically the U.S. would like to open these new markets to world trade. Realistically, we would like to see both occur under the protection of collective security alliances that include the United States.

In a veritable "World Turned Upside-Down" how is the U.S. to decide its military partners? As European Community commission President Jacques Delors stated in his March 1991 address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "All around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." (8: 6) How then is the U.S. to shape its foreign policy? According to Brzezinski, four factors will mold the formation of policy towards selective global commitment—the role of Europe, the future of the former Soviet Union, the organization of the Pacific Rim, and the status of the Middle East. (8: 7)

A Realistic Assessment

While the cries for "Fortress America" can be heard from those wishing to return to isolationism, the harsh reality is that the United States, along with most other industrialized nations of the world, has become too intertwined in a global economy to isolate itself politically, socially, or economically. It will therefore need to establish itself in this "new world order" as the guarantor of peace. This will necessitate a worldwide military presence or projection of power capability to each of the four areas previously discussed: Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Pacific Rim, and the Middle East.

Although many European countries are moving towards a common market economy, and a semblance of a regional military, an American presence in Europe is still clearly needed. If economic depravity were to infect the markets of the West as it has destroyed the government-run economies of the East, widespread disorder and increased nationalism may fragment a potentially volatile arena. Additionally, the American presence in Europe will certainly continue to act as an effective deterrent to the spill-over effects of Eastern European strife and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

A smaller force, capable of solidifying the "defense" of Europe and projecting a nuclear capability, is in line with the selective global commitment of U.S. forces.

The United States must remain determined to maintain its position in the Pacific. Although the U.S. is encouraging Japan to expand its role in the defense of Eastern Asia, a larger, technologically advanced Japanese Army will no longer possess solely defensive capabilities. Some Japanese have proposed replacing existing American units with newly formed Japanese units. The expansion of a Japanese military concurrent with Japanese growth in economy will likely produce friction between the U.S. and Japan. Additionally, an expanded Japanese military may appear threatening to other nations in the region, such as China and Korea. Marine Corps bases on Okinawa should remain functional, if some units are only cadred. Additionally, the U.S. must increase its naval presence in the region in order to promote stability in a region of new economic prowess.

As the Soviet Union falls in on itself, the United States must ease the transition for some of the key republics if only to curb the proliferation of nuclear arms. While this transition will certainly be lengthy and painful, it must also promise continuing improved relations with the West. If the former republics are allowed to become the cloisters of pre-Leninist Russia, the consequences for the

republics and the rest of the world may be devastating.

Nuclear and conventional weaponry, once strictly controlled by a central military hierarchy, is currently in the hands of numerous republics and could possibly be sold for hard currency (the purchasers being potential adversaries of U.S. interests abroad). It is therefore of paramount concern to the U.S. to contain existing hostilities within the borders of the former Soviet Union and to prevent the proliferation of hostilities into Europe and Asia. The U.S. must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent and sufficient naval and ground forces to react to any spill-over.

The U.S. will remain committed to the peace process in the Middle East. While we may be invited to intermittently station troops in host-nations, the feasibility of establishing a long-term military presence is low, and its desirability questionable. It is therefore important that naval and Marine forces increase the frequency of their presence in the region. While peace itself may remain elusive, the subtle reminder of American interest in the region may deter large scale conflict.

The United States, working in conjunction with the U.N. Security Council, will find itself in an ever-increasing role as the guarantor of world stability. By committing itself to collective security agreements and maintaining a visible presence, the U.S. will remain the primary nuclear and

conventional force deterrent. Although the size of the permanent force may be reduced, it will nonetheless be able to selectively react to whatever situation may arise.

CONCLUSION

When the use of military force is appropriate will remain a highly debatable issue, one that should be decided by the voice of the American people through their elected representatives. While it is the responsibility of the politicians to debate the possibilities, it is the responsibility of the military professional to be fully prepared to conduct any operations that the Commander in Chief directs.

As General Colin Powell explains:

Throughout our history, when our vital interests or those of our friends and allies have been threatened, often with very little warning, the US military has been called upon to both demonstrate US commitment and, when necessary, to fight.

It is certain that US military forces will be called upon again, but predicting the time, place, and circumstances will be difficult, as graphically demonstrated by recent political and military crisis in Liberia, Kuwait, Somalia, Iraq and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and in the Philippines.

Into the foreseeable future, the United States and its allies, often in concert with the United Nations, will be called upon to mediate economic and social strife and to deter regional aggressors. As the only nation with the military capability to influence events globally, we must remain capable of responding effectively if the United States is to successfully promote the stability required for

global progress and prosperity. (31: 4)

As we have shown, the Department of Defense is not a 911 emergency number that responds to the call of any country experiencing a crisis. A more accurate statement would be to say that the Department of Defense is our country's 911 number, and our armed forces are prepared to respond when the alarm is sounded by the President and the Congress. The United States is very selective when deciding when and where to commit our armed forces into action. Ultimately, our military forces are used to secure the welfare of the United States and its citizens.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

- *1. Strategic Studies Group X was a study group consisting of Navy and Marine Corps officers. The Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Frank B. Kelso, directed SSG X "to develop a detailed appreciation of the range of strategic environments and challenges that will confront the United States in the year 2010." (14, ii)
- *2. The Center for Defense Information is an independent organization made up of retired military and civilian personnel. It "supports an effective defense and opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of nuclear war. CDI believes that strong social, economic, political, and military components contribute equally to the nation's security."

 (13)

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IS THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE WORLD'S 911?

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26 March 1992

IS THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE WORLD'S 911?

Outline

Thesis: Recent world events have prompted some to claim that the United States' DOD has become the world's 911. An examination of this assertion indicates that the DOD only employs the armed forces to secure U.S. interests; therefore, the DOD is the United States' 911.

I. Introduction

- A. U.S. commits military to action to support our own interests.
- B. The DOD's stated purpose for use of military.
- C. Current national security philosophy expressed in the National Security Strategy.

II. Uses of military in support of U.S. interests

- A. Military Intervention.
- B. Military Support.
- C. Humanitarian Relief.
- D. Civic Action.

III. Conditions for use of military

- A. Secretary Weinberger's tests.
- B. Economic interdependence of nations.
- C. Opposing viewpoint of CDI.

IV. The threat

- A. U.S. position in international realm.
- B. Future strategic environment.
- C. Drug interdiction and the military.

V. Future of the military

- A. General Powell's plan for restructuring--The Base Force.
- B. Congressmen's opposing viewpoints.
- C. The role of the Marine Corps.

VI. Predictions

- A. Likely areas of military involvement based on U.S. interests.
- B. Assessment of strategic environment.

VII. Conclusion

- A. DOD is not the world's 911.
- B. Regardless of the debate, the military needs to be prepared.
- C. DOD/armed services -- the United States' 911.

IS THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE WORLD'S 911?

The employment of United States military forces will always be an issue of much concern. In the past decade alone our involvement in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait provoked varied opinions fervently expressed by both the American people and their elected representatives. Some have claimed that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become the world's 911 number. This term implies that the U.S. immediately responds to calls from any country who requests assistance in a crisis. The U.S. does employ its military forces to assist other nations, and in a variety of capacities, but it is not the world's 911. Whenever we intervene, United States interests are involved. An understanding of those interests helps military professionals prepare to defend them.

As stated in the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments, the Department of Defense maintains and employs the Armed Forces to:

support and defend the Constitution of the United
 States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

- ensure, by timely and effective military action,
 the security of the United States, its possessions,
 and areas vital to its interest; and
- uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States. (2: 2-5)

The constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in the execution of military action resides in the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates. The "national policy" of the nation in regard to national security is expressed in a document known as The National Security Strategy Of The United States. In the Preface to the August 1991 edition, President Bush states:

"We must not only protect our citizens and our interests, but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. We must work with others but we must also be a leader." (10)

This statement indicates a conscious decision on the part of the administration to take a prominent and active role in world affairs, but it also places conditions on U.S. involvement. "Our interests" and "our fundamental values" must be at stake.

As we have seen, the ultimate authority to commit military forces resides with the NCA. Brigadier General Krulak, Senior Military Assistant to the White House from 1986 to 1989, commented, "Make no mistake about it, it is the President who makes the final decision." (24) However, many sources influence the President in his decision—the advice of his political supporters and adversaries, professional military experts, and the voice of public opinion.

USES OF MILITARY

Military Intervention

The United States was thrust into the position of world leader immediately following World War II. Since that time the U.S. military has been committed to numerous actions, including forward presence, humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation operations, and full-scale combat operations. Precedents established by previous commitments of our military indicate that the U.S. has strategic concerns all over the world. Our armed forces have attempted to secure the national objectives of stopping the spread of communism and bringing stability to areas of strategic value to our country.

Korea

After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the Soviets occupied North Korea while the Americans occupied South Korea. The Soviets established a Communist government in North Korea and supervised a buildup of its army. In 1949, American forces withdrew from the Republic of South Korea believing it to be secure. (30: 202) On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army invaded the South resolving to reunify the country by force. When the U.N. Security Council asked member states to aid South Korea, President Truman committed U.S. forces. Shortly thereafter, forces from 15 nations arrived in support of the United Nations' proclamation. (25: 227) By early August three infantry divisions and a Marine brigade, 47,000 men, were defending the Pusan perimeter alongside United Nations and Republic of Korea forces. (44: 183)

Vietnam

When the French pulled out of Vietnam in the late 1950s, the United States encouraged the development of local governments in South Vietnam to build bases of support against Communist aggression. In December 1960 when the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam was

established in North Vietnam, it became clear that North Vietnam's military objective was to "liberate" the South.

(30: 226) Following the Battle of Ap Dac in January 1963, the leaders of South Vietnam concluded that the country would need assistance to remain free. President Diem solicited additional U.S. military assistance. Only after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, did the President gain congressional approval to send large numbers of U.S. ground forces to Vietnam. By the end of 1967, 500,000 Americans were at war with North Vietnam. (25: 450)

Grenada

On 23 October 1983, following a meeting of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a joint message
from Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Montserrat, and Dominica requested U.S. assistance in
restoring order to the island of Grenada. This appeal was
further reinforced when the Prime Minister of Barbados stated
that he had received correspondence from the Governer-General
of Grenada asking for assistance. (1: 228) President Reagan,
convinced that the island was being developed by the Cubans
for Soviet use and concerned for the welfare of the American
students, ordered a task force to respond. On 25 October
1983, the U.S. armed forces invaded Grenada to rescue

American medical students and restore order to this tiny Caribbean Island. (23: 90)

Panama

On 20 December 1989, the U.S. deployed American forces to Panama not to contain communism but to protect U.S. interests in the region. Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega had overthrown a democratic election and was threatening American servicemen and their families stationed in Panama. The U.S. made several attempts to negotiate an end to the crisis in pursuit of our own stated national interests—"to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty." (11: 194) Within 48 hours of the invasion, most of the DOD's military objectives had been secured.

Military Support

The term "military support" refers to a U.S. commitment of personnel or equipment to foreign nations to bolster indigenous capabilities. The following examples of military support reaffirm United States commitment to foster the creation of democracies abroad, establish and maintain

alliances and security relationships, and combat illicit drug trafficking. These are all goals and objectives listed in the National Security Strategy of the United States.

Israel

During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel asked for military equipment and support when a number of planes and tanks were lost in the fight for the Golan Heights. The Israelis were also quickly running out of ammunition. A few days later, President Nixon ordered a large-scale airlift to resupply the Israelis. Tanks and planes were deployed to Israel to replace their combat losses. The U.S. Air Force responded on a grand scale, mounting 20 flights per day carrying an estimated 2000 tons of material. (9: 287)

El Salvador

In 1980 a civil war erupted between the government forces of El Salvador and the guerilla forces of Faraibundo Marti National Front. Soon after, the United States sent 55 military advisors to train Salvadoran forces in Central America. This limit coincides with a ceiling mandated by Congress on the number of advisors deployable to El Salvador. (23: 90)

Burna

According to the U.S. State Department, the world's largest producer of opium is Burma; an estimated 1000 metric tons of the illegal drug were produced in 1987. In 1988, the Burmese government requested U.S. assistance in the fight against narcotics. In response to this appeal, the DOD provided helicopters and planes to aid in the intercept of aircraft attempting to transport illegal narcotics out of Burma. (25: 140) Today, the U.S. Army is providing counternarcotics assistance to numerous countries in Latin America, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Belize, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Mexico. The Army also provides training to the military forces of these countries in specialties like communications, special operations, and aviation maintenance. (17: 10)

Humanitarian Relief

Title 10 of the U.S. code authorize the DOD to provide humanitarian assistance to foreign nations if these actions will promote:

- (A) the security interests of both the United

 States and the country in which the activities are to

 be carried out; and
- (B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

Other prerequisite conditions for humanitarian assistance, including a cost ceiling, are delineated in Title 10. (40)

The DOD has conducted humanitarian assistance operations on numerous occasions.

Chile

On 21 May 1960, two earthquakes in Chile occurred within 24 hours, one measuring 8.3 on the Richter scale. Tidal waves swallowed the populated islands and battered coastal areas 500 miles south of Santiago. (37: 38) Within hours of the second quake, the Chilean government requested disaster relief assistance from the United States. By 30 May 1960, 59 Air Force Globemasters had transported several Army units to Chile. When the humanitarian effort ended in late June 1960, the Air Force had transported over 1000 tons of cargo in support of the relief effort. (20: 152)

Peru

On 31 May 1970, an earthquake rocked Peru leaving 70,000 dead and 800,000 homeless. Peru's President Juan Velasco Alvarado appealed to the world for relief assistance. Two days later, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command dispatched a disaster assistance survey team, Army helicopters, and essential relief supplies on Air Force C-130s. When American units returned stateside, Air Force C-130s and C-123s had transported 689 tons of cargo and evacuated 501 injured people on 234 sorties. (37: 38)

Columbia

In 1985, a dormant volcano erupted in Columbia killing 23,000 people. The U.S. Southern Command dispatched Army and Air Force units in the region. The 210th Combat Aviation Battalion in Panama provided aviation support for the operation. Within 36 hours of the eruption, 8 Blackhawk and 4 Chinook helicopters were enroute to assist Columbian residents trapped by the volcano. Air Force C-130s transported medical supplies, tents, and other relief necessities to the area. After 12 days of flying, Army aviators had hauled more than 300 tons of cargo and ferried 2700 passengers. (33: 37-41)

Civic Action

Civic action is much like humanitarian assistance, but it is on a more permanent basis. While humanitarian assistance is oriented towards "rescue" operations, civic action programs emphasize "nation building."

Korea

An early and important example of U.S. military involvement with foreign health care initiatives was in the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the late 1940s, numerous Korean medical personnel trained with U.S. Army medical units there. In 1949, a Korean Army Medical School was opened with the assistance of American military advisors. In 1950, many ROK medical personnel were trained in Army medical schools stateside. This program was considered a huge success; for years, ROK medical students trained in the United States were considered the leaders in Korean military medicine. (38: 12-13)

During the early 1960s, the United States became the principal provider of civic action programs in Latin America.

During this decade, 15 nations benefited from 3500 new

schools, clinics, and hospitals. U.S. military personnel also treated 3.5 million medical and dental patients in the southern hemisphere. (38: 14)

Vietnam

In 1970, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army awarded the 5th Special Forces Group a Civic Action Medal for its work in communities throughout Vietnam. The 5th Special Forces Group established 49,902 economic aid projects, 34,334 educational projects, 35,468 welfare projects, and 10,959 medical projects. The unit also dug 6,436 wells, repaired 1,949 kilometers of road, and built 129 churches, 110 hospitals, 1003 classrooms and 670 bridges. (1: 51-52)

Central America

Since the early 1980s, DOD medical personnel have been actively involved in every Central American country except Nicaragua and Belize. In 1983, for example, the Army's Combat Support Hospital, during a 6-month deployment to Honduras, treated over 40,000 medical and dental patients, and, in addition, provided veterinary care for 13,000

animals. Personnel from this unit also assisted Honduran medical personnel with an immunization campaign in the most isolated areas of the country. (38: 39)

The U.S. conducts these relief operations and provides foreign aid for a variety of reasons. From a humanitarian standpoint, the American people put a premium on reducing poverty and suffering in developing nations. From a political standpoint, when we provide this type of aid, we build alliances that benefit our nation and support our own concerns, such as gaining access to strategic minerals vital to our national defense. Economically, the U.S. benefits because many of these nations develop into strong trading partners, purchasing large amounts of U.S. goods.

CONDITIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Quite obviously, the United States has used its military capacity more frequently than the average citizen realizes. Our political and military leaders consider many factors before our armed forces are sent into action. Ultimately the decision to commit forces is made by the President, tempered by Congress. In his book <u>Fighting For Peace</u>, former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger recounts a speech to the National Press Club on 28 November 1984, entitled "The Uses of The Military." In this speech, Mr. Weinberger states

the six major tests he developed to determine whether or not the use of military force is warranted. Those six tests, in brief, are:

- 1. Our vital interests must be at stake.
- 2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the United States and our allies that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.
- 3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secure.
- 4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives.
- 5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people.
- 6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort. (43: 402)

The question of vital interests (test 1) provokes the real controversy surrounding the issue of military force.

What is or is not in our vital interests is not always apparent. Colonel Beavers, a member of the Strategic Studies Group X (see expl. *1), suggests our reasons for deploying military forces into action have undergone an evolutionary process. Initially, our justification was simply to provide for the "security of the United States and citizens abroad."

Trade, economic, and security factors expanded this phrase to "U.S. security, citizens abroad, and our allies." Finally, he prophesies that in the future, our armed forces will be used to protect not only the previously listed interests, but also "our way of life." Colonel Beavers states that "it is at this point that we will become the world's 911." He further clarified his interpretation of the "911 oncept" by

explaining that in the next twenty years, the economies of different nations will become even more intertwined, and many American jobs will depend on foreign economies. (5) The United States therefore will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that our quality of life is maintained at acceptable American standards.

Caspar Weinberger recognized the economic interdependence of America, and used it as part of his justification for ordering U.S. ships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers being threatened by Iran in the mid 1970's. Mr. Weinberger Stated that even though the oil on those tankers was not ours, loss of any oil intended for Europe or Japan would in fact affect us because we would then be competing for a share of a smaller worldwide "pool." In addition, he pointed out that a very large percentage of oil in the Gulf is lifted, shipped and refined by American oil companies. He goes on to say that closure of the Strait of Hormuz would directly affect American companies that paid U.S.corporate taxes and employed U.S. citizens. "There is one market for oil: a global market." (43: 391) Later in his book, he emphasizes this interdependence of nations:

Clearly, no nation is strong enough alone to keep its own freedom. Every nation requires alliances, friendships or association of one kind or another with other countries who share its goals and ideals. That truth certainly applies to the United States. (43: 429-430)

U.S. protection of the Mideast oil supply is not considered a "vital interest" by everyone. The Defense Monitor, a pamphlet published monthly by the Center for Defense Information (see expl. *2) titled its January 1991 issue "The U.S. as the World's Policeman? Ten Reasons to a Find a Different Role." This article acknowledges the fact that "there is no national consensus about what constitutes the vital interest of the U.S." It also points out that "there is also no consensus about how to protect [our vital interests]."

In opposition to Mr. Weinberger's argument, the authors of this pamphlet state that:

Persian Gulf oil is much less important to the U.S. than it is to Europe and Japan. Japan imports 99 percent of the oil it consumes, 70 percent coming from the Gulf countries. The U.S., on the other hand, imports 46 percent of the oil it uses. Only 24 percent of U.S. oil imports and 8.5 percent of total U.S. energy supplies come from the Persian Gulf. Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil together account for just 7.5 percent of all U.S. oil imports. (13: 2)

The authors also contend that "any hardships suffered by the U.S. from losing access to Persian Gulf oil or from an increase in the price of oil seems negligible when compared to the devastating costs of war." The article stresses the

economic benefits of bringing our troops home from foreign bases, and attempts to demonstrate that this removal would not degrade national security. (10)

THE THREAT

Major world events in the past few years, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union, have placed the United States in a position strikingly similar to its position immediately following World War II. As the only remaining superpower, we can expect to continue to play a large and influential part in world affairs. Undoubtedly we will be appealed to by nations in crisis situations. The National Security Strategy (AUG 91) states "We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security problems. But we remain the country to whom others turn when in distress." (10: 2) General Powell has stated:

We've heard it time and time again, America cannot be the world's policeman. Yet, as I've learned time and time again in the ... months that I've been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when there's trouble, when somebody needs a cop, guess who gets called to restore the peace? We do. (15:82)

Clearly then, the military must be prepared to secure the objectives identified by the Commander-in-Chief.
Weinberger believes that the Grenada operation proved that

the military was functioning as it was meant to--"that is, as an instrument to carry out and help realize the objectives of the President's foreign policy." (43: 131) In a rapidly changing and turbulent society, today's military must be ready to perform many different functions. As Brigadier General Krulak stated, "America will go to war again, but it is difficult to pinpoint where." (24)

As the Strategic Studies Group indicated in their report

The Future Strategic Environment, "There is no visible

evidence of any single nation or situation which has the

potential to pose the same menacing threat to the West that

the USSR did during the Cold War." (14: 35) The February

meeting between President Bush and Russian President Boris

Yeltsin at Camp David resulted in a declaration, signed by

both, outlining an almost unbelievably new kind of

relationship between the two nations. "The relationship will

be characterized by friendship and partnership founded on

mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy

and economic freedom." (18: A26)

Determining the threat in the post Cold-war period is no easy task. As General Powell states in the <u>National Military Strategy</u>, "The real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain." He points to an aggressive North Korea, a weakened Iraq, and perhaps even a hostile Iran as specific threats, but is wary of the "war that no one

predicted or expected." (31: 4) Many experts agree that regional problems in the world pose a potential threat to the U.S. and our allies, and will become more prominent in the future with the loss of a superpower to keep "hot spots" in check. Colonel Beavers anticipates that future regional conflicts will be due in part to a tremendous growth in population in countries that don't have the infrastructure to support it. As an example he predicts that the Middle East's population will double in the next twenty years. The widening gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" and ethnic diversity will also cause much unrest. Other "hot spots" include Africa; the Indo-Pakistan region; and Central and South America, where illegal drug trafficking is prevalent.

Among the goals and objectives listed in the National Security Strategy, the U.S. seeks to "aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking." (10: 4) This reflects the U.S. position that "democratic institutions" are a vital national interest and we could conceivably use military force in the future to support them. It also indicates that the war against drugs will continue to intensify. Americans are growing increasingly more aware of the danger that illegal drugs cause in our society; indeed, they threaten our way of life.

As public pressure increases, it is likely that the military will become even more involved in the counternarcotic effort.

Drug Interdiction and the Military

The tremendous increase in the illegal drug trade has been an issue in recent political campaigns. While most politicians view the use of DOD assets as a viable option, few can articulate its implementation. In 1987, an experiment in drug interdiction using DOD forces was conducted to evaluate what the politicians had long discussed.

In 1987, the National Guard of Arizona received plans for Operation Autumn Harvest. The concept of operations called for units from Arizona, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Utah to conduct a cooperative drug interdiction along the Arizona-Mexico border. (42: 4) The primary objective of the operation was to detect and apprehend smugglers bringing drugs into the United States (42: 6). The plan called for an integrated air defense system that would include ground based radar systems and customs intercept aircraft which would cover 84% of the Arizona-Mexico border. The four ground based stations, in conjunction with the aircraft, were to intercept and track suspected smugglers 24 hours a day for 30 days.

While the operation did not meet its intended objectives, it did provide the unit with outstanding training and provided for closer ties between the National Guard Bureau and the Customs Agency. Despite tracking 93 planes that fit the drug smuggling profile provided by Customs, only six of 33 planes tracked were intercepted. None had drugs on board. (42: 11)

In the case of Operation Autumn Harvest, the National Guard operated within the confines of U.S. borders. However, can the U.S. legally commit its troops to foreign shores in order to stop the influx of illegal drugs? Sections 371-374 of Title 10 United States Code provide loosely for involvement. (40) These sections of Title 10 will undoubtedly be amended in the future as the role of the military increases in fighting the drug war. The ramifications are clear; governments around the world feeling economic and political pressure from the United States may invite U.S. participation in their anti-drug efforts. The U.S. military will be playing a larger role in the war against drugs, but exactly what role our services will perform remains to be seen.

FUTURE OF THE MILITARY

As the nation faces the reality of a "new world order," the composition, structure and role of the U.S. military are undergoing intensive scrutiny, and in fact, are the subject of much debate. Decisions made now and in the near future will have a lasting impact on the United States' national security. To meet the security requirements of the changing global environment, and the reality of a significantly reduced defense budget, the armed forces of the United States are undergoing a major restructuring.

General Powell currently envisions: a Base Force of about 1,600,000 uniformed personnel, containing twelve Army divisions (down six from present levels), a 450-ship Navy (down eighty-nine warships), three Marine divisions and air wings (same number, but with deep manpower cuts), approximately twenty-six Air Force active duty and reserve forces tactical fighter wings (down about ten), and modernized strategic nuclear forces reduced in number as a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty may specify. (15: 82)

This projected Base Force is divided into four packages: Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces. The Strategic Forces mission will be to deter the threat of nuclear aggression, and these forces will continue to possess a triad of the most modern weapon systems. That is to say that we will have modern nuclear weapons capable of being launched from land, sea, and air

platforms. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), initially proposed by the Reagan administration, falls into this category. The SDI Organization, under direction of President Bush, has refocused its efforts on developing a system of global protection against limited strikes (G-pals) rather than protection against a massive Soviet strike. (3: 105) This shift is consistent with the uncertain threat and the increasing proliferation of nuclear technology.

Providing a forward presence for the Atlantic Forces will be one Army Corps, three to four Air Force wings, two carrier battle groups and Marine Forces. To reinforce these units in a crisis situation are U.S.-based forces in the form of one Army corps, two Air Force fighter, one Marine Expeditionary Force, and four carrier battle groups.

Forward presence for the Pacific Forces will be
"principally maritime, with half our projected carrier and
amphibious force oriented toward this area including one
forward deployed carrier battle group along with a Marine
Expeditionary Force." (31: 22) Units that remain in Japan
and Korea and forces in Alaska and Hawaii will act as both a
forward presence and a crisis response force.

Contingency Forces will be maintained at "the highest possible readiness" levels and will come from both deployed

and U.S. based Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces. The Commander in Chief of the various commands will have a "broad spectrum of capabilities" to choose from.

As General Powell points out, the Base Force is the force of the future, and not the current active duty force. He anticipates that the Base Force will be in place in 1995.

(31: 19-24)

The Base Force concept is under attack from some members of Congress. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Les Aspin, claims that the base force structure is "out of date." He feels that the plan reflects only the "first revolution" of the Soviet's "new era," that is, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. The plan does not reflect the "second revolution," the collapse of the Soviet Union that began with the failed coup attempt in August of 1991. (26: A10) Rep. Aspin also criticized General Powell for focusing on the capabilities of potential enemies when developing his plan. Instead, Rep. Aspin emphasizes the need to identify specific threats to U.S. interests and build our military forces on this basis. (34: 4)

Senators Nunn and Warner have also attacked the base force suggested by General Powell, calling for further analysis of the Service structures in light of the new threat environment. (26: A10) Both Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Powell are prepared for the debate ahead;

as Fowell said, "we'll be fighting a legislative war this year instead of one with people getting killed and injured."

(34: 3)

Role of the Marine Corps

In the current and future global environment, the Navy/Marine Corps team will continue to provide a wide variety of capabilities. Recently, the Marine Corps has participated in combat operations in Panama and the Middle East, humanitarian relief operations in the Philippines, non-combatant evacuation operations in Liberia and Somalia, and counternarcotic operations in Latin America. This versatility makes the Marine Corps the ideal force to deal with the "uncertain" threat of the future. As former commandant General Al Gray stated, "it is clear that our nation's Marine Corps is already organized for the security environment of the 21st century." (22: 67)

However, the Marine Corps will be undergoing restructuring along with the other services. From an end strength of 194,000 in 1991, the Marine Corps will come down to a strength of 177,000 by 1995. The mobility, versatility, and readiness that has always characterized the Corps will remain. Indeed, Brigadier General Krulak, who headed the force structure planning group for our current Commandant

General Mundy, stated that the Corps will be "more mobile and lethal than ever before." (24) The Corps' unique ability to integrate sea, air, and land battle will make it a prominent force providing both forward presence and force projection.

"This is our golden age" claims General Krulak. Defense analyst David Silverstein concurs; he states that "Marines have been oriented toward just the sort of conflict most likely to occur in the 1990's and beyond." (27: 16)

PREDICTIONS

While the 911 question in this paper's title is clearly rhetorical, it nonetheless deserves a definitive "NO" for an answer. The United States has never been the world's 911. If anything, it might be argued that we have arrogated to ourselves the right to involve our forces in the affairs of other nations. This, of course, is not the case either. The reality of U.S. military commitment worldwide as former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sees it, has been one of selective global commitment. (8: 7) With impending budget cuts and the end of the cold war, our approach to this commitment will become increasingly selective.

The United States now finds itself in a precarious power position. Morally, it feels compelled to aid in the

development of pluralistic governments in those nations previously dominated by the Soviet Union. Economically the U.S. would like to open these new markets to world trade. Realistically, we would like to see both occur under the protection of collective security alliances that include the United States.

In a veritable "World Turned Upside-Down" how is the U.S. to decide its military partners? As European Community commission President Jacques Delors stated in his March 1991 address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "All around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." (8: 6) How then is the U.S. to shape its foreign policy? According to Brzezinski, four factors will mold the formation of policy towards selective global commitment—the role of Europe, the future of the former Soviet Union, the organization of the Pacific Rim, and the status of the Middle East. (8: 7)

A Realistic Assessment

While the cries for "Fortress America" can be heard from those wishing to return to isolationism, the barsh reality is that the United States, along with most other industrialized nations of the world, has become too intertwined in a global economy to isolate itself politically, socially, or economically. It will therefore need to establish itself in this "new world order" as the guarantor of peace. This will necessitate a worldwide military presence or projection of power capability to each of the four areas previously discussed: Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Pacific Rim, and the Middle East.

Although many European countries are moving towards a common market economy, and a semblance of a regional military, an American presence in Europe is still clearly needed. If economic depravity were to infect the markets of the West as it has destroyed the government-run economies of the East, widespread disorder and increased nationalism may fragment a potentially volatile arena. Additionally, the American presence in Europe will certainly continue to act as an effective deterrent to the spill-over effects of Eastern European strife and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

A smaller force, capable of solidifying the "defense" of Europe and projecting a nuclear capability, is in line with the selective global commitment of U.S. forces.

The United States must remain determined to maintain its position in the Pacific. Although the U.S. is encouraging Japan to expand its role in the defense of Eastern Asia, a larger, technologically advanced Japanese Army will no longer possess solely defensive capabilities. Some Japanese have proposed replacing existing American units with newly formed Japanese units. The expansion of a Japanese military concurrent with Japanese growth in economy will likely produce friction between the U.S. and Japan. Additionally, an expanded Japanese military may appear threatening to other nations in the region, such as China and Korea. Marine Corps bases on Okinawa should remain functional, if some units are only cadred. Additionally, the U.S. must increase its naval presence in the region in order to promote stability in a region of new economic prowess.

As the Soviet Union falls in on itself, the United
States must ease the transition for some of the key republics
if only to curb the proliferation of nuclear arms. While
this transition will certainly be lengthy and painful, it
must also promise continuing improved relations with the
West. If the former republics are allowed to become the
cloisters of pre-Leninist Russia, the consequences for the

republics and the rest of the world may be devastating.

Nuclear and conventional weaponry, once strictly controlled by a central military hierarchy, is currently in the hands of numerous republics and could possibly be sold for hard currency (the purchasers being potential adversaries of U.S. interests abroad). It is therefore of paramount concern to the U.S. to contain existing hostilities within the borders of the former Soviet Union and to prevent the proliferation of hostilities into Europe and Asia. The U.S. must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent and sufficient naval and ground forces to react to any spill-over.

The U.S. will remain committed to the peace process in the Middle East. While we may be invited to intermittently station troops in host-nations, the feasibility of establishing a long-term military presence is low, and its desirability questionable. It is therefore important that naval and Marine forces increase the frequency of their presence in the region. While peace itself may remain elusive, the subtle reminder of American interest in the region may deter large scale conflict.

The United States, working in conjunction with the U.N. Security Council, will find itself in an ever-increasing role as the guarantor of world stability. By committing itself to collective security agreements and maintaining a visible presence, the U.S. will remain the primary nuclear and

conventional force deterrent. Although the size of the permanent force may be reduced, it will nonetheless be able to selectively react to whatever situation may arise.

CONCLUSION

When the use of military force is appropriate will remain a highly debatable issue, one that should be decided by the voice of the American people through their elected representatives. While it is the responsibility of the politicians to debate the possibilities, it is the responsibility of the military professional to be fully prepared to conduct any operations that the Commander in Chief directs.

As General Colin Powell explains:

Throughout our history, when our vital interests or those of our friends and allies have been threatened, often with very little warning, the US military has been called upon to both demonstrate US commitment and, when necessary, to fight.

It is certain that US military forces will be called upon again, but predicting the time, place, and circumstances will be difficult, as graphically demonstrated by recent political and military crisis in Liberia, Kuwait, Somalia, Iraq and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and in the Philippines.

Into the foreseeable future, the United States and its allies, often in concert with the United Nations, will be called upon to mediate economic and social strife and to deter regional aggressors. As the only nation with the military capability to influence events globally, we must remain capable of responding effectively if the United States is to successfully promote the stability required for

global progress and prosperity. (31: 4)

As we have shown, the Department of Defense is not a 911 emergency number that responds to the call of any country experiencing a crisis. A more accurate statement would be to say that the Department of Defense is our country's 911 number, and our armed forces are prepared to respond when the alarm is sounded by the President and the Congress. The United States is very selective when deciding when and where to commit our armed forces into action. Ultimately, our military forces are used to secure the welfare of the United States and its citizens.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

- *1. Strategic Studies Group X was a study group consisting of Navy and Marine Corps officers. The Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Frank B. Kelso, directed SSG X "to develop a detailed appreciation of the range of strategic environments and challenges that will confront the United States in the year 2010." (14, ii)
- *2. The Center for Defense Information is an independent organization made up of retired military and civilian personnel. It "supports an effective defense and opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of nuclear war. CDI believes that strong social, economic, political, and military components contribute equally to the nation's security."

 (13)

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